

Testing theories of causal reasoning using response times and deadlines

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Background

Knowledge about causality underlies most of our beliefs, attitudes, and judgements. However, there are big gaps in our understanding of how we reason about causes and effects.

Previous research has looked at three systematic deviations from the normative Bayesian point estimate:

- **Markov violations:** failure to appreciate independence of certain variables
- **Failure to 'explain away':** the presence of one cause decreases the probability of alternative causes
- **Weak inferences:** tendency to respond too close to 50%

Two theories account for these deviations, but they are hard to distinguish empirically.

Sampling theory


- People perform causal reasoning by generating samples of causal network states (D&R, 2018)
- Normative violations explained by:
 - Biased starting points
 - Using only a few samples
 - (Guessing 50% if state not sampled)
- Predicts **stronger violations if less time available due to generation of fewer samples**

Associative bias / heuristics

- Associative bias (Rehder, 2014): represent causal relationships as symmetric
- More associative responding under time pressure (dual processes)
- Would predict **stronger violations as reliance on heuristics is larger under time pressure**
- Heuristics: monotonicity, conflict aversion, ambiguity aversion (R&H, 2016)


Experiment

- 41 participants (18 excluded on accuracy)
- 243 trials per participant
- 3 variable causal networks:




Learning phase

- Each of 3 blocks started with a learning phase
- Quantitative information about the causal relationships was learned by viewing samples



Inference phase


- Response: **marginal or conditional probability** of causal variable
- 3 levels of time pressure: **6, 9, and 20s deadline**
- Responding using a joystick




Results

General

- Deadlines impact both accuracy and RT




- Participants less accurate the closer they get to the response deadline, this effect is stronger if the deadline is short.




Markov violations & Explaining away

- No effect of RT or time pressure



Weak inferences

- Increase with RT, and this effect stronger for high time pressure



Conclusions

- Data give **mixed evidence** for both accounts
- Dominant **theories cannot explain this pattern** of findings. At the very least they are incomplete.
- It might be guessing that leads to weak inferences. These **responses express uncertainty**.
- We are far from understanding the process of causal reasoning

Future directions

- LBA modelling
- Mixture modelling
- Elicit confidence judgements
- Individual differences: strategies