

Ignorance in context

The interaction of modified numerals and QUDs

Matthijs Westera
University of Amsterdam
Adrian Brasoveanu
UC Santa Cruz

Main contribution

A well-known contrast: (Geurts and Nouwen, 2010)
 (1) I saw *at most* seven of the coins. \rightsquigarrow *not sure how many*.
 (2) I saw *less than* eight of the coins. $\not\rightsquigarrow$ *not sure how many*.

Empirical & methodological puzzle:

- (1,2) contrast in **validity judgment** task; (Geurts et al.)
- but not in **truth judgment** task. (Coppock et al.)

Coppock et al.'s proposal:

- “at most” / “less than” are *semantically distinct*;
- this yields a difference in *ignorance implicature*;
- to which truth judgements are *insensitive*.

Problems (a.o.):

- other implicatures *are* detected by truth judgement;
- no other diagnostic is given for semantic difference.

We present **new evidence** for a *different* explanation:

- (i) what matters is the **question under discussion** (QUD);
- (ii) and how participants know/guess what it is.

Assumptions & crucial prediction

Ignorance inferences derive in two steps:

1. *What's the context like; was a precise answer desired?*
2. *If so, then why didn't the speaker give one?*

Step 1 relies on an **explicit QUD** or **intonation**.

Without those, **participants must guess** based on:


- **typical use:** (cf. Cummins et al.)
 “at most” \rightsquigarrow precise context;
 “less than” \rightsquigarrow imprecise context;
- **experimental task:**
 truth judgment \rightsquigarrow imprecise context;
 validity judgment \rightsquigarrow can be either.

This can explain the above puzzle.

Prediction: in a (textual) validity judgment task:

- if we present **QUDs of varying explicitness**,
- then the contrast (1,2) will appear & disappear.


Results of experiment I



Experiment design

Two experiments with the same design, three screens per stimulus:

1. **question** (QUD);
2. **answer**, shown word-by-word by self-paced reading;
3. **inference** with **validity judgment** (5-point Likert scale).



- 3 question types \times 2 answer types = **6 conditions**;
- latin square design, 108 stimuli (36 items + 72 fillers);
- 35 and 51 participants, respectively (ling. undergrads).

QUD types experiment I:

- **POLAR**: Did you *V Mod ten of the N PP*? ($V \in \{\text{see, hear, find}\}$, *Mod* same as in answer)
- **WHAT**: What did you *V PP*?
- **HOWMANY**: How many of the *N* did you *V PP*?


QUD types experiment II:

- **APPROX**: Approximately how many [...]?
- **EXACT**: Exactly how many [...]?
- **DISJUNCT**: Did you *V* eight, nine, ten or eleven [...]?

Answer types (same in both experiments):

- **SUP**: I *V* at most ten of the *Ns PP*.
- **COMP**: I *V* less than ten of the *Ns PP*.

Results of experiment II



Generalizations/discussion: Validity (scale 1-5)

Weak ignorance in **POLAR**, **APPROX**:

- Explanation: these do not ask for a precise answer.

Strong ignorance in **WHAT**, **EXACT**, **DISJUNCT**:

- Explanation: these ask for a precise answer.

Contrast SUP/COMP only in **HowMany**:

- Explanation: this is underspecified for precision...
- hence the *typical use* of “at most” / “less than” kicks in.

Generalizations/discussion: Reading times

Experiment I: slower reading \sim stronger judgments.

This may be due to:

- (i) **processing cost** of ignorance inference; or
- (ii) **subvocalization** with *contrastive topic* on modifier.

Experiment II: no effect, probably due to *priming*:

- fillers tested only ignorance inferences (unlike in exp. 1);
- *given priming*, slower reading \sim stronger judgments!

Broader implications

- Implicatures aren't *flimsy*; they are *context-dependent*;
- with underspecified context, typical usage kicks in;
- the same may explain Van Tiel et al.'s **scalar diversity**.