

# Ignorance in context

## The interaction of modified numerals and QUDs

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### Main contribution

- A well-known contrast: (Geurts and Nouwen, 2010)
- (1) I saw **at most** seven of the coins.  $\rightsquigarrow$  *not sure how many*.
  - (2) I saw **less than** eight of the coins.  $\not\rightsquigarrow$  *not sure how many*.

### Empirical & methodological puzzle:

- ▶ (1,2) contrast in **validity judgment** task; (Geurts et al.)
- ▶ but not in **truth judgment** task. (Coppock et al.)

Coppock et al.'s proposal:

- ▶ “at most”/“less than” are *semantically distinct*;
- ▶ this yields a difference in *ignorance implicature*;
- ▶ to which truth judgements are *insensitive*.

Problems (a.o.):

- ▶ other implicatures *are* detected by truth judgement;
- ▶ no other diagnostic is given for semantic difference.

We present **new evidence** for a *different* explanation:

- (i) what matters is the **question under discussion** (QUD);
- (ii) and how participants **know/guess** what it is.

### Assumptions & crucial prediction

Ignorance inferences derive in two steps:

1. *What's the context like; was a **precise answer** desired?*
2. *If so, then why didn't the speaker give one?*

Step 1 relies on an **explicit QUD** or **intonation**.

Without those, **participants must guess** based on:


- ▶ **typical use:** (cf. Cummins et al.)  
“at most”  $\rightsquigarrow$  precise context;  
“less than”  $\rightsquigarrow$  imprecise context;
- ▶ **experimental task:**  
truth judgment  $\rightsquigarrow$  imprecise context;  
validity judgment  $\rightsquigarrow$  can be either.

This can explain the above puzzle.


**Prediction:** in a (textual) validity judgment task:

- ▶ if we present **QUDs of varying explicitness**,
- ▶ then the contrast (1,2) will appear & disappear.

### Results of experiment I



### Results of experiment II



### Experiment design

Two experiments with the same design, three screens per stimulus:

1. **question** (QUD);
2. **answer**, shown word-by-word by **self-paced reading**;
3. **inference** with **validity judgment** (5-point Likert scale).

The judge asks: "What did you see under the bed?"  
The witness responds:

--- most -----

Based on this, the judge concludes:

"The witness doesn't know exactly how many of the coins she saw under the bed."

How justified is the judge in drawing that conclusion?

(not justified at all) 1 2 3 4 5 (strongly justified)

- ▶ 3 question types  $\times$  2 answer types = **6 conditions**;
- ▶ latin square design, 108 stimuli (36 items + 72 fillers);
- ▶ 35 and 51 participants, respectively (ling. undergrads).

### QUD types experiment I:

- ▶ **POLAR:** Did you *V Mod* ten of the *N PP*?  
( $V \in \{\text{see, hear, find}\}$ , *Mod* same as in answer)
- ▶ **WHAT:** What did you *V PP*?
- ▶ **HOWMANY:** How many of the *N* did you *V PP*?

### QUD types experiment II:

- ▶ **APPROX:** Approximately how many [...]?
- ▶ **EXACT:** Exactly how many [...]?
- ▶ **DISJUNCT:** Did you *V* eight, nine, ten or eleven [...]?

**Answer types** (same in both experiments):

- ▶ **SUP:** I *V* at most ten of the *Ns PP*.
- ▶ **COMP:** I *V* less than ten of the *Ns PP*.

### Generalizations/discussion: Validity (scale 1-5)

**Weak ignorance** in **POLAR**, **APPROX**:

- ▶ Explanation: these do not ask for a precise answer.

**Strong ignorance** in **WHAT**, **EXACT**, **DISJUNCT**;

- ▶ Explanation: these ask for a precise answer.

**Contrast SUP/COMP** only in **HOWMANY**:

- ▶ Explanation: this is underspecified for precision...
- ▶ hence the *typical use* of “at most”/“less than” kicks in.

### Generalizations/discussion: Reading times

**Experiment I:** slower reading  $\sim$  stronger judgments.

This may be due to:

- (i) **processing cost** of ignorance inference; or
- (ii) **subvocalization** with *contrastive topic* on modifier.

**Experiment II:** no effect, probably due to *priming*:

- ▶ fillers tested only ignorance inferences (unlike in exp. 1);
- ▶ *given* priming, slower reading  $\sim$  stronger judgments!

### Broader implications

- ▶ Implicatures aren't *flimsy*; they are *context-dependent*;
- ▶ with underspecified context, typical usage kicks in;
- ▶ the same may explain Van Tiel et al.'s **scalar diversity**.