{"id":3499,"date":"2018-03-28T14:02:21","date_gmt":"2018-03-28T12:02:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/projects.illc.uva.nl\/lgc\/seminar\/?p=3499"},"modified":"2018-04-08T20:07:20","modified_gmt":"2018-04-08T18:07:20","slug":"lira-session-alexandru-baltag-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/projects.illc.uva.nl\/lgc\/seminar\/2018\/03\/lira-session-alexandru-baltag-2\/","title":{"rendered":"LIRa Session: Alexandru Baltag"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Speaker: <a href=\"https:\/\/sites.google.com\/site\/thealexandrubaltagsite\/\">Alexandru Baltag<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Date and Time: Thursday, April&nbsp;12th 2018, 16:30-18:00<\/p>\n<p>Venue: ILLC Seminar Room F1.15, Science Park 107.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Title:\u00a0Some Thoughts on the Logic of Imprecise Observations<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Abstract:\u00a0This talk is based on joint work with Johan van Benthem. We propose a dynamic-epistemic analysis of perceptual knowledge, taking as our starting point the paradoxes posed by Williamson&#8217;s Margin of Error (MoE) principle. We argue that, contrary to initial intuitions, the specific entanglement between epistemic accessibility and perceptual closeness, that is claimed in\u00a0the MoE principle, is untenable and inconsistent with daily experience and the theory of measurements.\u00a0 However,\u00a0we think that it still contains valuable intuitions for a joint logic of closeness and knowledge, whose contours we develop, by placing structured observational events at center stage. In particular, our analysis explains how imprecise observation can lead to higher-precision knowledge, but also how can we find more plausible formalizations of MoE intuitions, in terms of principles limiting what can be learnt by perceptual observations.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Speaker: Alexandru Baltag<br \/>\nDate and Time: Thursday, April&nbsp;12th 2018, 16:30-18:00<br \/>\nVenue: ILLC Seminar Room F1.15, Science Park 107.<br \/>\nTitle:\u00a0Some Thoughts on the Logic of Imprecise Observations<br \/>\nAbstract:\u00a0This talk is based on joint work with Johan van Benthem. We propose a dynamic-epistemic analysis of perceptual knowledge, taking as our starting point the paradoxes posed by Williamson&#8217;s Margin of Error (MoE) [&#8230;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":13,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3499","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-events"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/projects.illc.uva.nl\/lgc\/seminar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3499","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/projects.illc.uva.nl\/lgc\/seminar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/projects.illc.uva.nl\/lgc\/seminar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projects.illc.uva.nl\/lgc\/seminar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/13"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projects.illc.uva.nl\/lgc\/seminar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3499"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/projects.illc.uva.nl\/lgc\/seminar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3499\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3507,"href":"https:\/\/projects.illc.uva.nl\/lgc\/seminar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3499\/revisions\/3507"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/projects.illc.uva.nl\/lgc\/seminar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3499"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projects.illc.uva.nl\/lgc\/seminar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3499"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projects.illc.uva.nl\/lgc\/seminar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3499"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}