This talk will have two parts.

 In the first part I will use truth maker semantics to account for epistemic and deontic modalities. Instead of facts making sentences true, I will use sets of facts (some would call them `teams’) to support sentences. In data semantics (Veltman, Landman), a support-relation between facts and modal sentences is defined in terms of extensions of these facts. Such an analysis won’t get the free choice data right. On an analysis using sets of truth makers, such data can be accounted for as well. (For this part I worked together with Søren Knudstorp). 

In the second part I talk about syllogistic logic, and provide an intensional semantics for it. Whereas the standard semantics for syllogistic reasoning is extensional (the meaning of a predicate is modelled by a set of individuals), on an intensional semantics  the meaning of a predicate is modelled by a set of features. The latter analysis was preferred by Leibniz and many philosophical logicians well into the 20th century, also because it is closer to cognitive approaches to meaning. Still, these logicians didn’t work out an intensional analysis that could also account for complex predicates. I show how this could be done. 

Finally, I will relate the intensional semantics in terms  of features with truth maker semantics.