Speaker: Branden Fitelson (Northeastern University, Boston)
Date and Time: Thursday, December 16th 2021, 16:30-18:00, Amsterdam time.
Venue: online.
Title: Probabilities of Conditionals & Conditional Probabilities — Revisited
Abstract. Lewis’s (1976) triviality argument against The Equation (a.k.a, Adams’s Thesis) rests on an implausibly strong presupposition about the nature of (epistemic) rational requirements. Interestingly, Lewis (1980) later rejected this presupposition. In his discussion of the Principal Principle, Lewis assumes something weaker, and more reasonable, about the nature of rational requirements. In this paper, I explain how to apply the insights of Lewis (1980) to repair Lewis’s earlier (1976) discussion. This leads to a more reasonable rendition of The Equation — one which is (a) immune from triviality, and (b) a better candidate for a (bona fide) rational requirement.